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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the role of corporate governance in cross-border investment. The emphasis on foreign
investment is driven by evidence that international diversication is benecial to investors despite increased
nancial market integration and systemic crises (Levy and Sarnat (1970); Santis and Gerard (1997); Das and
Uppal (2004)). In this respect, corporate governance, with its peculiar role of facilitating access to external
nance through reduction of information asymmetry (La Porta et al. (1998); LLSV (1998) henceforth), can
be critical in attracting foreign portfolio investment, which is indeed particularly sensitive to information
barriers.
Standard asset pricing models using a representative agent predict that di¤erences in investor rights and
nancial development should be capitalized in share prices such that investing in any given nations stocks
will be a fair investment regardless of that nations level of investor protection (Dahlquist et al. (2003)).
However, as noted by Leuz et al. (2009), the key question is whether this price discount is su¢ cient for
foreign investors that plausibly face information problems beyond those of domestic investors. Indeed, the
prevalence of disproportionate investment in domestic assets the so-called "home bias" puzzle can be
read as evidence of the asymmetric perception of asset characteristics by home and foreign investors thus
breaking the representative agent hypothesis (Gehrig (1993); Kang and Stulz (1997)).
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) and Kang and Stulz (1997) emphasize that large, nancially solid,
well-known rms are preferred by foreigners, thereby underlining the asymmetry between resident and
foreigner investors. Chan et al. (2005) investigate the determinants of foreign and domestic investment,
nding that familiarity and variables capturing investment barriers have a signicant but asymmetric e¤ect
on domestic and foreign bias1. These ndings are consistent with the conjecture that foreign investors are
more vulnerable to information asymmetry than domestic investors; hence, they might be more inuenced
by governance rules that reduce information costs.
Whenever the representative agent hypothesis is challenged, asset prices inevitably disclose only the
average e¤ect of investor protection legislation on investors as a whole. In this work, we are interested in the
1The same foreign-domestic asymmetry is found in Guiso et al. (2009), where domestic investors rank their own managers
higher than do foreign investors.
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impact of investor protection laws on stock and bond portfolios held by foreign investors2. This e¤ect cannot
be observed directly from market price or total market capitalization, since these indicators capture only
the aggregate equilibrium behavior. Previous work originating from LLSV (1998) underlines how investor
protection a¤ects nancial market development, that is, the supply of equity, leaving the demand side mostly
unexplored. This latter perspective is relevant insofar as we account for heterogeneity across investors. For
instance, Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) show that investor protection impacts nancial market development
by inuencing the demand for equity, because di¤erent classes of investor can di¤er in the benets accruing
to them and therefore in their willingness to pay for stocks. Specically, controlling shareholders can gain
access to both private and security benets and thus be willing to pay more for a stock than investors who
can enjoy only security benets. These authors theoretical model provides several testable implications
with respect to home bias and stock market participation rates. However, they assume that domestic and
foreign outside investors face the same cost of participation in both domestic and foreign markets. This
hypothesis is quite strong and admittedly at odds with the prolic empirical literature emphasizing the role
of asymmetric information as a potential explanation for the home bias puzzle. Our perspective can be
viewed as complementary to Giannetti and Koskinen (2010): while they split the universe of investors into
inside and outside investors we focus on outside investors only, in order to test whether corporate governance
evenly a¤ects all portfolio investors or whether it is particularly relevant to foreign investors. A perspective
much closer to ours is taken by Leuz et al. (2009). They investigate the impact of rm-level corporate
governance on foreign holdings and nd that foreigners invest less in rms with poor outsider protection
and opaque earnings.
We depart from previous works in that we investigate the e¤ect of investor protection laws on foreign
portfolio investment  debt and equity portfolios  accounting for the interaction of various governance
mechanisms on stakeholders endowed with di¤erent rights and interests.
In fact, any analysis of the e¤ects of investor protection laws should carefully account for the conicting
interests of the various stakeholder groups. Within the corporation, the distinct interests of managers, stock-
holders and creditors coexist and are often in conict with one another. It may be the case that legislation
particularly favorable to one type of stakeholder turns out to be detrimental to others. Shareholder-manager
2We ignore any direct explanation relative to the home bias phenomenon and focus on the determinants of foreign positions.
However, domestic positions, though not explicitly investigated here, impact our analysis indirectly: the weight of each foreign
stock index in the overall portfolio also depends on the domestic share. See Giannetti and Koskinen (2010) for a discussion of
the implications of minority investor rights on home equity bias.
3
conict has received much attention in the literature, but important sources of conict can also arise between
shareholders and bondholders. The corporate governance literature has analyzed the complex mechanisms
of conicts of interest between shareholders and creditors, suggesting that the potential conict between
equity and debt claimants lies primarily in wealth expropriation and risk shifting (Jensen and Meckling
(1976)). These conicts can give rise to interesting e¤ects on portfolio decisions making on the part of
foreign investors. Specically, strong shareholder rights protection are likely to benet foreign shareholders
("direct" e¤ect) but may also deter foreign bondholders ("cross" e¤ect) as shareholders are more prone to
risk-taking activities than is optimal for creditors (Myers (1977); Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Creditors
might indeed be more in line with managers, who may be more concerned with their own job security and
so choose to undertake less risky projects. On the other hand, strong creditor rights are likely to attract
foreign bondholders ("direct" e¤ect) but may deter stock investments ("cross" e¤ect) if rms are induced
to engage in risk-reducing processes such as acquisitions that are likely to be value-destroying (Acharya
et al. (2008)). Ultimately, the question of the impact of investor protection provisions on foreign stake-
holders, the focus of the present paper, is an empirical one and depends on foreignersperception of the
balance among various interests. Our results highlight that laws protecting the interests of di¤erent types
of investors asymmetrically a¤ect foreign stakeholders and, more specically, that foreign portfolio investors
more highly value corporate governance practices that are risk-reducing than do domestic investors. Foreign
shareholders appear to appreciate strong creditor rights that potentially mitigate the riskiness of projects,
while bondholders are negatively a¤ected by strong shareholder rights that could induce the rm to engage
in risky asset investments.
Finally, our ndings also contribute to the literature that investigates the failure of convergence in
investor protection legislation. Djankov et al. (2008) nd no convergence in creditor rights scores. La Porta
et al. (2000) reject the hypothesis of legal convergence of rules and enforcement mechanisms toward some
successful standard of e¤ective investor protection. These authors claim that this is due to the dominance
of interest group politics: extensive legal, regulatory and judicial reform are needed but governments are
reluctant, as the rst order e¤ect is a tax on insiders. Mansi et al. (2009), focusing on the heterogeneity across
US stateslegislation, critically discuss the evidence of no polarization toward a system of stronger or weaker
investment protection. Di¤erent states compete also on legal dimensions in terms of their e¤ectiveness in
attracting investment but competition does not necessarily induce a "race to the bottom" or a "race to
the top". Firms, in fact, sort themselves either away from binding payout restrictions that reduce nancial
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exibility and value, or toward greater restrictions that reduce debt nancing costs. Not all jurisdictions
then need or should converge to the single best or worst alternative. Rather, the existence of a variety of
jurisdictions and di¤erent economic environments allows rms to maximize value by choosing a set of laws
most appropriate to their own situation. Our ndings contribute to this debate by providing an indirect
rationalization of the evidence of no convergence toward the strongest investor protection setting: investor
protection can be benecial to one type of investor and detrimental to another. Accordingly, the level of
investor protection in each country is endogenously determined by many conicting forces, among which
are the political choice to promote inward investment and to favour some classes of investor over others.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After describing the conceptual framework and its
main implications in Section 2, we present our empirical analysis in Section 3, describing the econometric
setting, the data and the results. Section 4 summarizes the main ndings and addresses the potential policy
implications of our analysis.
2 A conceptual framework
Our theoretical framework relies on equilibrium portfolio allocations in which investors are supposed to face
di¤erent costs from investing in various nancial markets. According to Gehrig (1993), foreign investments
appear on average more risky to domestic investors leading to an information-based justication to home
bias  and portfolios di¤er among investors depending on the perceived variance-covariance matrix. We
adopt this approach, shifting the focus to foreign investment exclusively, considering a di¤erent investor-
specic perceived variability of return for each foreign index in the investment opportunity set. Details on
the derivation of the model are provided in Appendix A. In the model, the "unbiased" portfolio holding of
an asset depends, as in standard portfolio choice theory, on asset characteristics (risk and return). When
considering equilibrium asset holdings without investment barriers, all investors ought to hold the same
portfolio (value-weighted portfolio) in which each asset is weighted according to its stock market capital-
ization (MS). Importantly, the same portfolio is universally optimal in equilibrium even in the presence of
investment barriers, provided that these barriers identically a¤ect all investors. Conversely, heterogeneity
in bilateral-specic investment barriers generates a wedge between the investor-specic portfolio and the
value-weighted portfolio. This wedge depends, in particular, on how far the bilateral investment barrier of
country l investing in country j is from the average barrier of all countries investing in the same asset j.
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Denoting by Dlj the relative (to world average) investment barrier of country l investing in asset j, the
optimal portfolio weight in asset j (wlj) by country l is
wlj =
1
Dlj
MSj (1)
where MSj is the market share of asset j in the world market capitalization and
1
Dlj
represents the relative
(with respect to world average) "advantage" of country l investing in asset j. In other words, this variable
captures the inverse of the investors relative (to world average) investment barriers (direct barriers, such
as transaction costs, or indirect ones, such as information barriers) in holding asset j: an investor residing
in country l will demand a share of asset j greater than its market share in proportion to
1
Dlj
(inverse of
the relative investment cost)3.
By taking the logs of the above expression we obtain
log

wlj
MSj

= log

1
Dlj

(2)
The ratio wljMSj can be interpreted as the bilateral bias in asset j by a representative investor in country
l. If the actual position wlj is larger than js market share, then there is a positive bias, while a ratio lower
than 1 reveals a negative bias. The above relation implies that the bias in asset j by investors residing in
country l depends on the reciprocal of the bilateral-specic investment barrier relative to the world average
investment barrier. In other words, the larger the bilateral-specic investment barrier relative to the world
average, the lower the actual position in a given asset4. In our analysis, the risky assets can be either stocks
or bonds, as the risk-free asset is determined in the model as the residual portfolio share.
2.1 Estimable equation and testable implications
To estimate (2) we must provide an empirical counterpart to the variableDlj , which is not directly observable.
Our nal estimable regression is as follows
3Note that if Dlj = 1, i.e., if the investment barrier for country l in country j is equal to the average, then the market share
of asset j is optimally held in equilibrium.
4Our theoretical framework is equivalent to the Chan et al. (2005) and Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) return-reducing approach.
In fact, at equilibrium, what matters is the investment barrier relative to the average investment barrier. In our approach
investment barriers enter in a multiplicative way, making our equation conveniently implementable and interpretable in log
terms.
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wklj
MSkj
!
= k +
P
i=1;::;I
k;i log(Xilj) +
P
n=1;::;N
k;nY nlj +
P
h=1;::;H
k;h log(Zhj ) + "
k
lj (3)
where the superscript k = B;S identies bonds (B) or stocks (S).
All equilibrium factors, that is factors that are common to all investors, domestic and foreign, are
captured on the left-hand side by market share (MS), which is jointly determined with the market price in
equilibrium. In the presence of heterogeneity in the perception of asset variability, the asset price reveals
the average perceived variability. Any di¤erence between foreign and domestic portfolio investors in the
perception of this same factor can create a wedge between the actual position (w) and market share.
We consider i proxies, denoted by Xlj and n dummy variables Ylj which might, a priori, capture bilateral
investment barriers. If we consider, for instance, the distance between country l and j as an indicator of
investment cost, we expect a negative sign for the associated  coe¢ cient: a higher "relative proxy" (e.g.,
greater distance between investing country l and target country j with respect to average distance) is
associated with investor l biasing her portfolio away from country j stocks5. The main variable of interest
in this paper is investor protection laws, a destination-country-specic variable (Zj) and is included in our
specication since it may represent a potential device to overcome information barriers for foreign investors.
Since total market capitalization in any country must be held in equilibrium by some investors, a country
cannot be underweighted by all investors. This implies that a country-specic variable can a¤ect foreign
holdings only if this variable is di¤erently weighted by domestic and foreign investors6. Indeed, if a country-
specic variable h were equally a¤ected all investors in the economy, foreign and domestic ones, its coe¢ cient
h ought to be null since the equilibrium asset price should fully incorporate any asset-specic characteristic
(Dahlquist et al. (2003)).
Since we are interested in testing the direct and cross e¤ects of investor protection laws on di¤erent
types of stakeholders shareholders and bondholders we need to estimate (3) for stock portfolios (3a) and
bond portfolios (3b) separately.
5Note that all variables that capture bilateral investment barriers enter our specication in relative terms, i.e., relative to
the average world investment barrier.
6As discussed below, when checking for the robustness of our results, we account for the fact that market share also comprises
closely held shares that are not available for portfolio investment (column (5a)). Therefore, we modify the measure of the total
asset supply following Dahlquist et al. (2003), and our ndings still hold. Moreover, by including investing country xed e¤ects
we also partially control for di¤erent degrees in investor protections across investing countries that Giannetti and Koskinen
(2010) address as potential drivers of home bias.
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To estimate the above parameters, we adopt a feasible Generalized Least Squares specication that
assumes the presence of cross-section heteroskedasticity and that includes xed e¤ects for investing countries,
time dummies, and cross-section weight correction of the variance-covariance matrix7.
We keep the variables that capture shareholder rights (sh_r) and creditor rights (cr_r) out of the pool
of destination-specic variables Zhj in order to separately discuss their e¤ect on the dependent variable. We
label as a "direct" e¤ect the impact of corporate rules on "target" investors, i.e., of shareholder (creditor)
rights on shareholders (bondholders); this is measured by S (B). We expect these coe¢ cients to be positive;
that is, we expect foreign stock (bond) investment to be enhanced by stronger shareholder (creditor) rights
S (B) > 0: We label as a "cross" e¤ect the impact of corporate rules on "non-target" investors, i.e.,
creditor (shareholder) rights on shareholders (bondholders); this is measured by S (B).
Our setting allows us to directly test two main implications.
The rst generally addresses the issue of the di¤erent role played by corporate governance rules with
respect to foreign versus domestic investors. If the direct e¤ect of investor protection rights (sh_r and
cr_r) were the same for all portfolio investors in the market, domestic and foreign, we should nd that the
null hypothesis
1. H0 : S = 0 ^ B = 0
is not rejected, that is, we should nd no e¤ect on foreign investment since high or low protection should
be priced by the market (Dahlquist et al. (2003)).
Since bilateral portfolio bias is explained by relative (to average) investment barriers, the coe¢ cients
S and B attached to the investor protection variables are di¤erent from zero only if the impact of this
7As an alternative, we have also run a Pooled OLS regression with xed e¤ect for investing countries, time dummies and
White correction of the variance-covariance matrix. Our ndings remain una¤ected under this alternative specication.
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variable on the investors considered, i.e., foreign investors, di¤ers from the impact on domestic investors, and
therefore from the average impact that determines the equilibrium price. Conversely, a signicant coe¢ cient
of country-level investor protection laws for foreign investors can be read as a signal of the asymmetric impact
of corporate governance on foreign and domestic investors. In particular, evidence of positive (negative)
coe¢ cients of investor protection rights on foreign portfolio positions can be interpreted as better corporate
governance rules in a particular country fostering (deterring) inward investment.
The second testable hypothesis concerns more specically the cross e¤ect of investor protection on foreign
investors. Specically:
2a. if S > 0 ^ B > 0 (positive cross e¤ect), then strengthening investor protection is always a desirable
policy to attract foreign investments, and policies leading to stronger investor protection should be
encouraged without reservation;
2b. if S < 0 ^ B < 0 (negative cross e¤ect), then a systematic trade-o¤ between direct and cross e¤ects
exists and policies aimed to strengthen investor protection are not necessarily universally optimal;
2c. if S < 0 ^ B > 0 or S > 0 ^ B < 0; then the trade-o¤ exists for only one type of investor
protection legislation and policies need to be designed accordingly.
Let us assume that the rst hypothesis is not rejected, i.e., direct e¤ects are always positive, and let us
focus on cross e¤ects. If investor protection laws were benecial for all foreign stakeholders both bond-
holders and shareholders we should observe an unconditionally positive impact of creditor and shareholder
rights on foreign portfolio investments (hypothesis 2a) such that stronger investor protection rights would
be universally advisable to increase inward investment. Conversely, if cross-e¤ects were systematically neg-
ative (hypothesis 2b) there would be a trade-o¤ between the e¤ect of corporate rules on "target" investors
(e.g., shareholder rights rules on shareholders) and on "non-target" investors (e.g., shareholder rights rules
on bondholders), and both types of investor protection rules would have to be carefully gauged to account
for the trade-o¤ between direct and cross e¤ects. Finally, we might observe a trade-o¤ between direct and
cross e¤ects holding exclusively for one type of investor protection (hypothesis 2c). If S < 0 ^ B > 0,
then foreign shareholders should be negatively a¤ected by strong creditor rights, since these can result in
value-destroying processes such as mergers and acquisitions (Acharya et al. (2008)); the positive impact
of shareholder rights on bondholders is less economically interpretable since bondholders have a quite low
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upside potential from riskier projects. Finally, the set of parameter estimates S > 0^B < 0 would instead
reveal that creditor rights positively a¤ect foreign shareholders and shareholder rights negatively inuence
foreign bondholders. The last joint hypothesis is not rejected by the data and represents the main innovative
ndings of this paper: strong creditor rights shifting the rm toward less risky behavior a¤ect positively
(S > 0) foreign shareholders, while strong shareholder rights  shifting the rm toward riskier projects
a¤ect negatively (B < 0) foreign bondholders. This evidence suggests that foreign stakeholders value
risk-reducing practices more than domestic stakeholders do, thus providing support to the conjecture that
foreign stakeholders are relatively more sensitive to the perceived riskiness of domestic assets.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
We consider bilateral portfolio investments in equities and debt securities by 14 major investing countries
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States for the period 20012006. We adopt the CPIS (Coordi-
nated Portfolio Investment Survey, by IMF) dataset which has been exploited in many recent papers (Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007); Sorensen et al. (2007); Fidora et al. (2007)). This survey collects security-level
data from the major custodians and large end-investors. Portfolio investment is broken down by instrument
(equity or debt) and residence of issuer, the latter providing information on the destination of portfolio
investment8.
The opportunity set is made up of 20 destination stock markets: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States9.
Finally, the full set of regressors included in the analysis is described in detail in Appendix B and its
impact on portfolio investment is discussed in next session.
8While the CPIS provides the most comprehensive survey of international portfolio investment holdings, it is still subject to
a number of important caveats. See www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm for more details on the survey.
9Since we focus on foreign portfolio allocation, the destination stock markets number 19, since the domestic country is
excluded from analysis. The GLS regression is run, therefore, on 1576 observations (19 observations for each year for each
investing country, with some missing values). As is common practice, Switzerland, Luxembourg and Ireland are excluded from
the sample since they are considered in the international nance literature as mainly o¤-shore nancial centers.
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3.2 Results
3.2.1 Descriptive statistics on foreign bias
We show in Table 1 average domestic share for each investing country. For reference, we report in the
second column average market share, that is, the respective fraction of world market capitalization that
would prevail as optimal portfolio share under the assumption of no market segmentation. As expected,
all countries display home bias; that is, they place a disproportionate fraction of their nancial wealth in
domestic assets. All countries invest internally more than 50 percent of their portfolio, with Austria and
Netherlands the only exceptions for stocks and Austria for bonds. Quite interestingly, the home bias in
bonds is on average higher than in equities, consistent with the ndings of Sorensen et al. (2007). The
pervasive and persistent home bias reveals the asymmetric investment behavior of foreign and domestic
investors with respect to asset-observable characteristics. In Table 2 , we turn from home bias to bilateral
foreign bias, computed as the ratio of actual share to market share, following equation (2). We report average
bias in several destination countries, obtained by averaging across investing countries the bilateral foreign
bias. There emerges a notable degree of heterogeneity in bias toward various foreign assets. To provide an
economic interpretation for this measure, consider that a bias measure equal to 1 implies that the foreign
asset enters the portfolio with a weight equal to its stock market share. The evidence that foreign bias is
almost always below unity i.e., the evidence that foreign assets are underweighted is not surprising given
the strong home bias reported in Table 1. Notwithstanding the larger home bias in the bond portfolio,
the median foreign bias is larger for bonds than for stocks: the median destination country enters with
58 and 43 percent of their market share in the bond portfolio and stock portfolio, respectively. The stock
market foreign bias ranges from 0.12 for Canada to 1.09 for Sweden, which jointly with Finland, are the
only countries overweighted on average by foreign investors. In the bond market, the lowest foreign bias is
found in South Korea and Japan (0.03) while the highest is found in Netherlands (1.21). Interestingly, the
destination countries with a foreign bias above the median, both in the stock and in the bond portfolios, are
mainly members of the European Monetary Union (EMU). These ndings are consistent with the evidence
of Balta and Delgado (2009) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), who nd a notable increase in foreign
investments in EMU countries by EMU countries as a result of monetary integration. For our purposes,
the most intriguing element is the overall heterogeneity across destination countries. This indeed suggests
that there might be some country-specic e¤ect among which are investor protection laws making some
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countries more attractive than others for foreign investors. Finally, in the last column, we report the standard
deviation of the bilateral foreign bias around the average: this provides information on the dispersion of the
bilateral foreign bias of various investing countries with respect to the average. The degree of dispersion,
compared to the average, is quite large: on average, the standard deviation is 90 percent of the average
bias for stocks, with roughly the same magnitude for bonds. The evidence of strong dispersion underlines
another interesting feature for our analytical purposes: beyond the di¤erences between domestic and foreign
investors and the di¤erences arising from destination-country e¤ects, there might also be investing-country
e¤ects and/or bilateral-specic components that induce di¤ering evaluations of the same assets by di¤erent
investors. This suggests the need to consider both bilateral-specic and country-specic factors as potential
determinants of cross-border investment in our empirical analysis10.
3.2.2 Stock market
Bilateral-specic regressors We rst account for bilateral-specic factors as the natural determinants of
bilateral bias in the foreign portfolio. The rst variables included in the regression analysis are the proximity
variables. Market proximity captures the inuence of asymmetric information on investor portfolio choice
(Gehrig (1993); Brennan and Cao (1997); Kang and Stulz (1997)). Many empirical contributions nd
that the cultural and geographic proximity of the market has an important inuence on investor stock
holdings and trading (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001); Chan et al. (2005); Portes and Rey (2005)). The
regressors included are distance, common border dummy and common language dummy11. The common
border (language) dummy takes the value 1 if the investing and destination country share a common border
(language) and 0 otherwise. The rst two variables, distance and common border, simply capture physical
distance between the country of the investor and the destination country12. Since transactions in nancial
assets are "weightless", a role for distance may be found only if it has informational content (Portes and
Rey (2005)). The role of the common language dummy is immediately interpretable, since foreign languages
make collecting information more di¢ cult. These variables play an economically and statistically signicant
role in explaining the dependent variable as conrmed by the sizeable adjusted-R2 (0.6). The elasticity of
10Consistent with our approach, Guiso et al. (2009) nd that the perceived credibility of managers in various nations depends
on matchspecic, destination-countryspecic, and source-countryspecic factors.
11See Appendix B for further details.
12A separate role for the border dummy can be found insofar as this variable is considered as "correcting" the distance
variable, which is measured as the great circle distance between the capital cities of the destination and investing countries.
Note that, consistent with the theoretical framework, the distance variable enters our regression in relative terms.
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foreign bias to relative distance is about 0.5, while sharing a common language increases portfolio bias by
16 percent (e0:151 = 1:163) and a common border boosts the dependent variable by 80 percent.
We then account for other bilateral variables, capturing bilateral-specic linkages: namely, common
currency area (EMU), common exchange platform (Euronext), and common legal origin. Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007) and Lane (2006) analyze the portfolio investment patterns of EMU countries after EMU
integration revealing, for both xed securities markets and stock markets, a Euro-area bias; that is, EMU
member countries disproportionately invest in one another relative to other country pairs. Moreover, after
controlling for EMU integration, Giofré (2008) nds a separate role for the consolidation of stock exchanges
in the Euronext platforms. This reects, on the one hand, higher liquidity enhanced by stock market mergers
(Padilla and Pagano (2005)), and on the other hand the common platform may have helped to alleviate
informational asymmetries by inducing adoption of common standard accounting rules and practices. The
EMU (Euronext) dummy takes the value 1 if the investing and destination countries are EMU (Euronext)
members and 0 otherwise. The coe¢ cients of both variables are positive and signicant and their e¤ect is
quite large: EMU membership and Euronext membership boost bilateral bias by 2.5 times and 1.2 times,
respectively.
Finally, sharing the same legal framework might encourage cross-border investment since there is less
fear of unknown factors (Guiso et al. (2009); Lane (2006)). We include a dummy variable (dummy_eq_law)
taking the value 1 if the investing and destination countries share the same legal framework (i.e., civil law
or common law) and 0 otherwise. However, in the spirit of LLSV (1998), common law countries should
provide both shareholders and creditors the strongest protection: the common law status of a destination
country should represent, per se, a factor attracting foreign investors, thus reducing the role played by the
same legal family factor. We therefore also interact common legal origin with a dummy taking the value
1 if the destination country belongs to the common law family and 0 otherwise, with the expectation of
a negative sign. In column 2, both the dummy_eq_law and its interaction with the common law status
of the destination country have expected positive and negative sign, respectively, but are not statistically
signicant (column (2)). However, they become very signicant in statistical and economic terms when
controlling for other factors (columns (3)-(7))13.
13Our results are consistent with Vlachos (2004), who shows that cultural and regulatory di¤erences generate a negative
impact on cross-country portfolio holdings.
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Investor protection variables After controlling for bilateral-specic regressors, we shift the focus of our
analysis to destination-country-specic factors14. Asset-specic factors are relevant only to the extent that
there is some heterogeneity in their evaluation on the part of investors. Otherwise, any asset-specic factor
should be properly capitalized into the assets market price (Dahlquist et al. (2003)). In our case, if all
investing countries equally weighted a given factor, there should be no impact on portfolio bias. Conversely,
if one type of investor were more heavily a¤ected than other investors by one factor, this should play a
signicant role in determining portfolio allocation (Leuz et al. (2009)). More specically, if foreign investors
were particularly inuenced by investor protection laws, these laws should help to explain the distance
between the foreign portfolio position and what is predicted by market share.
We include rst the variables capturing investor protection rights (column (3)). It is worth noting that
the endogeneity critique often raised against LLSV (1998) is much less an issue here. In fact, whereas in
LLSV (1998) the direction of causality between investor protection laws and development of nancial markets
(aggregate asset supply) is controversial, this is not the case in our analysis. The dependent variable here is
the bilateral bias (bilateral asset demand), that is, the ratio between bilateral portfolio position and market
share, and the direction of causality, if any, goes arguably from investor protection to portfolio bias.
Investor protection laws can inuence equity portfolio bias through either "direct" or "cross" e¤ects. The
direct impact of investor protection laws is the e¤ect of shareholder rights on foreign shareholders. The index
of shareholder rights (LLSV (1998)) measures how strongly the legal system favors minority shareholders
against managers or dominant shareholders in the corporate decision making process15. The cross e¤ect is
instead the e¤ect of investor protection legislation on "non-target" investors namely, the e¤ect of creditor
rights on foreign shareholders. Creditor rights are captured by an index aggregating the rights of secured
lenders following LLSV (1998)16. The index measures the legal rights of creditors against defaulting debtors
in di¤erent jurisdictions, and has been interpreted by recent literature as a measure of creditor power.
Results on the direct e¤ect of shareholder rights are qualitatively consistent with recent evidence by
Leuz et al. (2009) and Thapa and Poshakwale (2009). Specically, destination countries characterized by
shareholder protection rights 1 percent higher than the average are relatively more attractive for foreign
14The regression includes xed investing country e¤ects to take into account the specicity of the investor.
15As discussed below, we consider as an alternative measure to shareholder rights, the "corrected" antidirector rights index
as redened in Spamann (2010). Our results hold under both specications.
16We have also considered the time-varying version of the creditor rigths index adopted in Djankov et al. (2007). However,
being the index substantially unchanged for the countries included in our sample and for the time period considered, our results
persist unaltered.
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shareholders inducing a foreign bias larger by 0.4 percent. Interestingly, also the cross e¤ect of creditor rights
on stockholders is positive, statistically and economically signicant, and its size constitutes one-third of
the direct e¤ect (column (4)). Creditor rights might impact, a priori, foreign equity portfolios in either
direction: on the one hand, stronger creditor rights might be viewed as mitigating rm risk-taking, thereby
lowering the perceived variability of the underlying asset; on the other hand, as suggested by Acharya et al.
(2008), strong creditor protection laws might induce rms to engage in risk-reducing investments, such as
diversifying acquisitions that are potentially ine¢ cient and value reducing. Excessively strong creditor rights
in default could lead to ine¢ cient liquidations that extinguish the continuation option of a rms enterprise
and thereby hurt stockholders. When creditor rights mandate the dismissal of management, a private cost
is imposed on managers. To avoid these costs, shareholders and managers lower the likelihood of distress
by reducing operating risk. If this implies a reduction in value not compensated adequately by a reduction
in risk, then creditors rights entail dead-weight costs to rms and to the whole economy. In particular,
Acharya et al. (2008) nd that stronger creditor rights are associated with lower operating risk and a greater
propensity to pursue diversifying acquisitions and mergers. Since corporate diversication has been shown
in some studies to destroy value, strong creditor rights may have negative consequences for shareholders.
The evidence in our analysis shows that strong creditor rights laws have a positive impact on shareholders,
thus suggesting that the risk-reducing e¤ect prevails over the prot-reducing e¤ect. This outcome can be
easily rationalized from a foreign investors perspective because, as the literature shows, foreign investors
are relatively more severely a¤ected by information asymmetry. Such investors plausibly perceive domestic
assets as more risky than do domestic investors (Gehrig (1993)), such that any institutional devices allowing
investors to reduce riskiness are more valuable to foreigners than to domestic investors.
To be sure that what we capture is the e¤ect of investor protection laws, we control in column (5) for
correlated confounding factors. LLSV (1998) show how creditor and shareholder rights are strongly linked to
legal origin. We therefore include a series of dummies to capture the legal family of the destination country
(French, English, German and Scandinavian)17. Since the English origin dummy is multicollinear with the
variable dened above that is obtained by interacting dummy_eq_law and the common law status of the
destination country, we need to drop two legal family dummy variables out of four to avoid multicollinearity
(the second dummy dropped is the Scandinavian origin dummy). We are therefore left with the German and
17This is a destination-country-specic dummy and is di¤erent from the above-mentioned common legal framework variable,
which is a bilateral-specic variable identifying whether investing and destination countries share the same legal framework
(common law or civil law).
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French legal system dummies. The evidence is consistent with LLSV (1998) and suggests that French and
German legal origins induce lower investments. Interestingly, even after accounting for the legal origin of the
destination country, shareholder rights and creditor rights are still economically and statistically relevant in
explaining foreign investment.
We then control for other destination country-specic variables potentially correlated with investor
protection so that, if omitted, can bias the coe¢ cients of the included regressors. In particular, we include
three variables that capture the soundness of the economic environment from a more general to a more
specic level: one variable that captures the general level of (control of) corruption in the economy, one
variable related to (control of) expropriation risk, and one variable capturing the transparency of accounting
rules.
Previous literature has indeed documented that fraudulent transactions, bribery, unenforceable con-
tracts, legal and regulation complexity can signicantly a¤ect portfolio investments (Gelos and Wei (2005);
Leuz et al. (2009)). Control of corruption and control of the risk of expropriation capture government stance
toward business while accounting standards are critical to corporate governance in that they render com-
pany disclosure interpretable. Aggarwal et al. (2005), nd that countries with better accounting standards,
shareholder rights, legal frameworks, and rms issuing ADRs attract more US mutual fund investment rela-
tive to benchmark indices. Their results emphasize that high-quality accounting information allows foreign
investors to monitor and protect their investments and to e¢ ciently allocate capital. Analogously, we nd
that while control of corruption and risk of expropriation show a non-systematic impact on foreign portfolio
investment, good accounting practices have a strong and robust impact. Moreover, investor protection vari-
ables have a stronger e¤ect on portfolio positions when controlling for economic environment factors: both
the direct and the cross factor increase by more than one standard deviation.
Substitutes for investor protection rules In principle, a strong system of legal enforcement could
substitute for weak rules: active and well functioning courts can serve as recourse for investors aggrieved by
management (LLSV (1998)). To account for this substitution e¤ect, we control for ownership concentration
and e¢ ciency of the judicial system, which can substitute for legal protection in an environment of poor
investor protection.
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Ownership concentration A potentially powerful substitute for poor legal structure is ownership
concentration. In the presence of poor investor protection, ownership concentration becomes a substitute
for legal protection (LLSV (1998)). Some concentration of ownership within a rm is typically e¢ cient in
providing managers incentives to work and in providing large investors incentives to monitor managers and
thus increase the value of the rm (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). However, some dispersion of ownership is
also desirable to diversify risk.
We incorporate the e¤ect of ownership concentration using two alternative procedures. First of all we
account for it by correcting the foreign bias portfolio for the fraction of shares closely held (column (5a)).
Second, we consider the impact of ownership on foreign portfolio bias and its indirect impact through
shareholder rights (column (6)). Let us illustrate the rst procedure. Dahlquist et al. (2003) estimate the
fraction of shares closely held across 51 countries, nding that on average 32 percent of shares are not
available for trading and cannot therefore be held by foreign investors. This illustrates a measurement error
in the size of domestic and foreign bias that was neglected by previous literature. These authors construct the
world oat portfolio, which considers only shares that can actually be held by investors. Following Dahlquist
et al. (2003), we consider the fraction of closely held shares as exogenous, thus making it relatively easy to
correct the exogenous asset supply and to compute the corrected bias measure. The dependent variable to
be explained in column (5a) is therefore changed as the share in the world oat portfolio now replaces the
market share in the denominator of the foreign bias measure. In principle, this measurement error, albeit
relative to the dependent variable, can potentially a¤ect our results, since countries with stronger protection
rights are those with a lower proportion of closely held shares. In column (6a), we report results after
adopting the world oat portfolio. Interestingly, we observe a stronger direct and cross impact of investor
protection rights: the impact of shareholder rights is more than twice as large while the impact of creditor
rights is three times larger18.
Secondly, in column (6), we include ownership concentration directly, as a possible determinant of foreign
position: this is an alternative way to account for closely held shares, since countries with the largest fraction
18Previous studies that analyze the e¤ect of governance on foreign investments provide a mixed picture. Dahlquist et al.
(2003) nd that di¤erences in investor rights and nancial development across countries cannot explain the portfolio investment
of US investors when including the oat portfolio as determinant. However, Leuz et al. (2009) nd opposite results when
considering heterogeneity in governance practices across US rms: some rms can be underweighted and other overweighted
resulting in no e¤ect in the aggregate. Although keeping an aggregate perspective similar to Dahlquist et al. (2003), we shift
from a US-based perspective to a cross-section of investing countries diversifying their portfolios and obtain results consistent
with Leuz et al. (2009). Moreover, our specication allows us to overcome the serious issue of low number of observations (about
20) in Dahlquist et al. (2003), a factor that can have severely undermined the statistical inference on the estimated coe¢ cients
of investor protection variables.
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of closely held shares are also those in which ownership concentration is stronger. Moreover, the inclusion
of ownership concentration allows to consider it as a determinant of the demand side more than as a factor
correcting the supply side. Ownership concentration per se might have an impact on foreign bias since
expropriation by controlling shareholders could be perceived as particularly dangerous by foreign minority
shareholders. We observe indeed that countries with higher ownership concentration attract less foreign in-
vestment. More interestingly for our analysis, ownership concentration could also a¤ect portfolio investment
through investor protection laws. On the one hand, the more concentrated the ownership structure in the
economy, the more important are shareholder protection rights that defend minority shareholders. On the
other hand, as suggested by LLSV (1998), the weaker the investor protection, the more incentive toward
ownership concentration. These two e¤ects are in contrast with one another and it is impossible a priori to
predict the sign of the coe¢ cient for the interaction of shareholder rights with ownership concentration. In
our regression, the sign of this coe¢ cient is positive but not statistically signicant. By comparing column
(5) with column (6), we note how, the introduction of concentration of ownership weakens the role played
by legal family dummies, French and German origin. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) assess that ownership
is more concentrated when investor protection is weaker. Accordingly, we nd that, when accounting for
concentration, the coe¢ cients of the dummy for French and German legal family, originally negative, are
either reduced in size or become non-signicant. Since legal family origin is correlated with investor protec-
tion, which in turn is correlated with ownership concentration, the negative impact of French and German
legal origin on foreign investment is captured mainly by the ownership concentration coe¢ cients19.
E¢ ciency of the judicial system Finally, the e¢ ciency of the judicial system can act as the most
obvious substitute mechanism for poor investor protection laws. If this is the case, we should observe that
the stronger the e¢ ciency of the judicial system, the lower the impact of investor protection laws. In column
(6), we interact both creditor rights and shareholder rights with the e¢ ciency of the judicial system to infer
how the importance of the law on the books depends on the degree of e¢ ciency of the judicial system.
What we observe is in line with the ndings of LLSV (1998) and in contrast with the substitutability
hypothesis: stronger e¢ ciency of the judicial system reinforces the role played by investor protection on
foreign investments; that is, the laws on the books are more e¤ective when they are better enforced.
19 It is often recommended in statistics textbooks to center continuous variables (subtract the mean) before interacting them,
to make the e¤ects more easily interpretable. This reccommendation is fullled here since, consistent with the theoretical model,
all continuous variables are entered in logs and in relative terms with respect to the world average (i.e., their logs are demeaned).
18
Robustness For robustness check we consider as an alternative to shareholder rights as dened in LLSV
(1998), the "corrected" antidirector rights index as rened in Spamann (2010)20. The author, by a reex-
amination of the legal data, derives more precise estimates of antidirector rights leading to corrections for
forty-three of the forty-six countries analyzed in LLSV (1998). The di¤erence between corrected and original
values is such that many empirical results established using the original indexes may not be replicable with
corrected values21. Consequently, our results may be potentially invalidated when considering Spamann
(2010) indexes. In column (6a) we report results when the original LLSV (1998) indexes are replaced by the
revised Spamann (2010) indexes. Our results are robust to the alternative revised specication of antidi-
rector rights: the coe¢ cient of Spamann (2010) index is even more signicant, in statistical and economic
terms, and most of other coe¢ cients are basically una¤ected by the alternative specication. Interestingly,
the coe¢ cient of the interaction between ownership concentration and the corrected measure of shareholder
protection becomes large and signicant: the more concentrated the ownership structure in the economy,
the more important is the role played by shareholder protection rights for foreign investors.
In summary, we underscore that both shareholder rights and creditor rights positively inuence foreign
portfolio investments. Foreign stock portfolio investments are attracted by strong shareholder rights, which
better protect portfolio minority investors. Also, strong creditor rights, by mitigating excessive risk exposure,
turn out to benet foreign shareholders, who are more sensitive to information asymmetry than domestic
shareholders. Quite interestingly, the cross e¤ect, that is the coe¢ cient of creditor rights, is comparable in
size to the coe¢ cient of shareholder rights. This piece of evidence suggests that ignoring the cross e¤ect
of investor protection laws entails missing a prominent component of the incentives provided by corporate
governance for foreign investors.
3.2.3 Bond market
Bilateral specic regressors We now replicate the same analysis, taking the perspective of foreign
bondholders. Our objective is to identify the direct and cross e¤ect of investor protection laws on cross-
border investment in xed securities.
Following the above analysis, we rst consider bilateral-specic variables as determinants of heterogeneity
in portfolio position, then focus on destination-specic variables.
20See Spamann (2010) for further details on the corrected index.
21As stressed by Spamann (2010), Djankov et al. (2008) adopted a "revised" version of the antidirector rigths index incorpo-
rating most of the corrections suggested in an early manuscript of the Spamann (2010) article.
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In column (1) we show that the distance variable has a signicant impact on bondholders, with a coe¢ -
cient even larger than for stockholders, while the border dummy shows a counterintuitive negative coe¢ cient.
The language dummy is strongly signicant, even more so than for stocks: sharing a common language has
the e¤ect of increasing the dependent variable by 2.7 times. When controlling for other determinants, this
e¤ect is signicantly reduced to 35 percent, but is still twice as large as the corresponding e¤ect for stocks.
In column (2), the EMU dummy coe¢ cient appears to be quite large and strongly signicant: the common
currency area determines an impact almost ve times larger for member countries. The e¤ect is stronger
than in the stock market case while sharing a common stock exchange (Euronext), which plays an important
role for stockholders, does not positively a¤ect bondholders. This latter piece of evidence shows that the
information content of the common Euronext platform does not spillover from the stock market to the bond
market. The dummy_eq_law variable shows a negative sign but this seems to be the result of an omitted
variable problem. Indeed, after controlling for other correlated factors, the impact of this variable turns out
to be positive while its interaction with the common law nature of the destination countries results not
signicantly a¤ecting foreign portfolio investments (columns (6)-(7))22.
Investor protection variables As for stocks, destination-country-specic factors could be responsible
for heterogeneity in portfolio bias to the extent that these factors do not evenly a¤ect all investors. We rst
focus on the direct e¤ect, i.e. on the e¤ect of creditor rights on foreign bondholders. The adopted measure
of creditor rights indicates how easily a creditor may exercise her rights or how easy it is to foreclose on
collateral (LLSV (1998)). We expect strong creditor rights to induce more investment in debt securities, as
investors are better protected against the risk of default.
What we immediately observe in column (3) is that the coe¢ cient of creditor rights is instead negative.
These ndings are at odds with our predictions, but the type of index of investor protection adopted
necessitates a caveat: while shareholder rights is an indicator well tailored for our purposes, the interpretation
of the variable that captures creditor rights is less straightforward. There are di¤erent types of creditors,
with di¤erent interests; protecting the rights of some creditors might have the e¤ect of reducing the rights
of others. Senior loans have priority over bondholders, preferred shareholders, and common stockholders
22 In the rst specications, when the coe¢ cient of the dummy_eq_law is (counterintuitively) negative, the interaction of the
dummy_eq_law with the dummy capturing the common versus civil law origin of the destination country is (counterintuitively)
positive: it has an opposite sign with respect to the dummy_eq_law, conrming the conjecture that the common law legal
origin of the destination country mitigates the e¤ect of sharing the same legal background. The interaction turns out to be
non-signicant in the full specication case, where the equal law variable becomes, consistent with the expectation, positive
and signicant.
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in the event of default. In assessing creditor rights, LLSV (1998) take the perspective of senior secured
creditors, as most debt around the world is of that type. In case of a default, senior secured creditors may
have a simple interest in taking possession of collateral no matter what happens to the rm, whereas junior
unsecured creditors may wish to preserve the rm so that they can possibly get some of their money back in
case the rm eventually makes some prots. What we actually observe in our analysis is the e¤ect of senior
secured creditor rights on bond investments such that we can expect a less clear-cut direct e¤ect than for the
stock portfolio23. However, insofar as particular legitimate interests are better protected in an institutional
environment more e¤ectively guaranteeing individual rights, we should observe, after controlling for other
correlated determinants, a positive inuence of creditor rights on foreign bondholders. This is indeed the
case: after controlling for the role played by the e¢ ciency of the judicial system, creditor rights are found
to positively a¤ect bond bias (column (6)-(7))24.
The predicted direction of the cross e¤ect, namely the e¤ect of shareholder rights on bondholders, is
theoretically not so obvious.
On the one hand, an e¤ective corporate governance mechanism can a¤ect bond yields and ratings
through its impact on the default risk of the rm. Indeed, e¢ cient governance mechanisms reduce potential
conicts of interest between management and providers of capital through e¤ective monitoring. This can
reduce expropriation or misallocation of funds, improve the rms productivity and disclosure and could
be perceived positively by bondholders, resulting in a reduction in the default risk of the rm and thus
predicting a positive impact of strong shareholder rights on bondholders.
On the other hand, bondholders and shareholders can also have conicting interests. In particular,
bondholders and stockholders can disagree about the amount of risk the rm should take. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) detail how the existence of outstanding debt creates a moral hazard
problem where stockholder interests diverge from the interests of creditors. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
underline how highly leveraged rms, i.e., rms where creditors are more at risk, have incentives to engage
in risky asset portfolios because of information asymmetry. If we view the equity of a leveraged rm as
equivalent to a call option, we can easily see how shareholders have incentive to increase the riskiness of
23The cross e¤ect of creditor rights on foreign shareholders discussed in the previous subsection, is much less controversial; it
indeed captures how foreign shareholders benet from the protection of interests limiting downside risk, regardless of the nature
of the protected creditor.
24We made several attempts to nd a more specic measure capturing bondholders rights but we could not nd any valuable
alternative. Lacking a specic measure, we chose therefore to adopt a general index capturing, albeit imprecisely, protection
a¤orded to creditors. The correct positive sign recorded in the full specication regressions reassures us about the reliability of
the index.
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the rm: the payo¤ to shareholders is unbounded, so there is some positive probability of a large payo¤,
whereas debt holderspayo¤ is limited. The moral hazard problem can of course be mitigated using restrictive
covenants, but the costs of writing and enforcing these contracts are not economically trivial. Furthermore,
even costly and severe constraints can leave open opportunities to shift risks and rewards.
On an empirical level, Klock et al. (2004) investigate the impact of anti-takeover provisions on wealth
transfers between stockholders and bondholders. Bondholders, by denition, have a limited upside poten-
tial and signicant downside risk. Takeovers, which increase the nancial risk of the rm by adding debt,
can therefore result in wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders. This suggests that provisions
shifting power from managers to shareholders can result in shareholder expropriation of bondholder wealth.
Market-based data provide evidence that antitakeover amendments, although not benecial to stockhold-
ers, are viewed positively in the bond market: strong antitakeover provisions (weak shareholder rights) are
indeed associated with a lower cost of debt nancing. This analysis strongly suggests that it is important
to examine the e¤ects of governance provisions on all classes of securities before concluding that particu-
lar provisions are desirable. Cremers et al. (2007) emphasize how policies beneting stockholders do not
generally benet bondholders. In particular, various governance mechanisms available to shareholders can
have di¤erent consequences for bondholders. For example, acquisitions and disciplinary takeovers can ben-
et target shareholders but also hurt target bondholders by adding more debt to the rm as rm leverage
generally increases after a takeover. This increase in leverage can reduce the value of outstanding bonds,
not only by increasing the probability and the deadweight costs of a possible future bankruptcy, but also by
reordering the priority of claims in bankruptcy.
However, the cost of debt, which is the focus of the above-mentioned contributions, does not reveal the
existence of di¤erences in the e¤ects that these conicting interests can generate on foreign investors with
respect to home country investors, because what is priced by the market is aggregate behavior. Ultimately,
the question of the impact of shareholder protection provisions on foreign bondholders is an empirical one
and depends on foreignersperception of the balance between various interests.
To estimate the cross e¤ect of investor protection on bondholders, we add in column (4) the shareholder
rights variable to our specication and nd a negative but not precisely estimated impact on bondholders.
However, after controlling for the legal family of the destination country and the soundness of the economic
system (column (5)), which are correlated with investor protection legislation in the destination country,
the negative cross e¤ect of shareholder rights (about -0.3) emerges and remains economically and statisti-
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cally signicant in all subsequent specications. Control of corruption and accounting transparency, when
statistically signicant, have the expected positive sign and are quite large in size. Conversely, the control
of expropriation risk variable has a not well-dened impact on bond portfolios.
Substitutes for investor protection rules We control for possible mechanisms to substitute for the
role played by creditor rights, analogously to what we have done for shareholder rights. The coe¢ cient of
the interaction of the e¢ ciency of the judicial system with creditor rights is positive. This suggests that
the e¢ ciency of the judicial system amplies the e¤ect of creditor rights. The risk run by creditors mainly
consists of default risk and the priority of claimants such that the role played by the judicial system is
inevitably particularly relevant25.
Robustness As a robustness check we adopt in column (6a) the Spamann (2010) index as alternative to the
shareholder right index proposed by LLSV (1998). Our results still hold under this alternative specication,
even though the size of the coe¢ cient of shareholder rights is halved. Conversely, the coe¢ cient of creditor
rights benets from the adoption of the Spamann (2010) index, becoming more signicant in statistical and
economic terms.
Our ndings uncover for bondholders a positive role played by creditor rights conditional on the e¢ ciency
of the judicial system, and a negative impact of shareholder rights, which are perceived to increase the default
probability. Strong shareholder rights can be detrimental to foreign bondholder interests as they can induce
excessive risk-taking behavior in rms.
To provide robustness to our most innovative result, that is the evidence of negative cross e¤ects of
shareholder rights on bondholders, we directly test the impact of one specic legislation that potentially
favours shareholders to the detriment of bondholders. In particular, as discussed above, the negative cross
e¤ects could be related to the antitakeover legislation that can asymmetrically impact bondholders and
shareholders (Klock et al. (2004)). We directly test the impact of antitakeover legislation on bondholders,
adopting the takeover index recently developed by Nenova (2006)26. In column (7) the shareholder index is
replaced by the takeover index and the sign of the coe¢ cient remains negative. It points to the advocated
antitakeover legislation as one specic legal mechanism potentially responsible of the negative impact of
25For comparison with the analysis of stock portfolios, we have also controlled for concentration of ownership (results no
reported, but available upon request): the e¤ect of concentration on bondholders is non-signicant and the role played by
shareholder rights is not inuenced whatsoever by ownership concentration.
26See Nenova (2006) for a detailed discussion on the components of the takeover index.
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shareholder right protection on foreign bondholders. The takeover index is signicantly and positively
correlated with the level of takeover activity Nenova (2006), as measured by the volume of takeovers, and
is highly positively correlated with investor protection Rossi and Volpin (2004). It should then be not so
surprising that we nd a negative coe¢ cient of its impact on bondholders. What instead is not so obvious
is the size of the impact of the takeover index on foreign debt investment. Since both shareholder rights
and takeover indexes enter our regression in relative terms, i.e., as logarithm of the ratio of the index with
respect to the average, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient cannot be ascribed to the di¤erent unit of measure
but rather to the explanatory power of the regressor. Comparing column (6) with column (7), we note that
the elasticity of the foreign portfolio bias to the relative takeover index is indeed ve times larger than the
elasticity with respect to shareholder rights. Specically, a country with a relative shareholder rights index
higher by 1 percent determines a reduction in foreign portfolio bias by 0.3 percent for bondholders while the
same variation in the takeover index causes a reduction in portfolio bias by 1.7 percent. The coe¢ cient of
creditor rights, capturing the size of the direct e¤ect, becomes even larger and the e¢ ciency of the judicial
system gains importance in amplifying both the (negative) impact of takeover legislation and the (positive)
impact of creditor rights. These results strongly support takeover legislation as one specic legal feature
that might asymmetrically inuence inward bond and stock investment.
Finally, we conrm and reinforce the evidence on the relatively strong importance of cross e¤ects over
direct e¤ects. In fact, the role of creditor rights is generally more signicant for shareholders than for bond-
holders and the negative impact of shareholder rights protection on bondholders turns out to be greater (in
absolute value) than its positive direct impact on foreign stock positions. These results suggest that policies
designed to attract foreign investments ought to take into account the interaction of multiple governance
mechanisms, since the cross e¤ects of investor protection laws are not necessarily second order e¤ects.
4 Summary and conclusions
We investigate the impact of investor protection laws on foreign bilateral investment, namely foreign equity
portfolio investments and foreign bond portfolio investments. The empirical literature has shown that
market capitalization as a whole depends positively on investor protection but these ndings do not permit
disentangling foreign from domestic e¤ects. Asset prices in fact reect the joint behavior of foreign and
domestic investors and we must examine foreign allocation decisions to uncover the impact of corporate
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governance on foreign stakeholders. Analogously, results on the impact of shareholder rights and creditor
rights on rm value or debt cost hide the role played by foreign investors.
Our results show, rst, that investor protection laws have a signicant impact on foreign investments,
thus implying di¤ering e¤ects of corporate governance provisions on domestic versus foreign investors. These
ndings are consistent with results in Leuz et al. (2009) relative to outward equity investment by US rms.
We generalize their results to di¤erent investing countries and to debt securities. Specically, we nd that
strong shareholder rights (creditor rights) stimulate foreign equity (bond) portfolio investments. Since for-
eign investors are mostly a¤ected by information asymmetry issues, these ndings can also be interpreted as
corporate governance rules serving as a means to overcome information asymmetries and thereby to enhance
international diversication. Secondly, our ndings highlight how laws protecting di¤erent interests asym-
metrically a¤ect foreign stakeholders. This result represents the most innovative contribution of the paper
to the extant literature. More specically, we highlight that foreign shareholders appreciate strong creditor
rights, which potentially mitigate the riskiness of projects, while bondholders are negatively a¤ected by
strong shareholder rights, which might induce the rm to engage in excessively risky behavior. Importantly,
our results are robust to a di¤erent specication of shareholder rights and the negative cross e¤ect on foreign
bondholders can be plausibly ascribed to antitakeover legislation asymmetrically inuencing inward bond
and stock investment.
The immediate implication to draw from this picture is that strengthening investor protection is not
a universally desirable policy. Specically, our results suggest that stronger creditor rights are helpful in
attracting foreign investment, while stronger shareholder rights are e¤ective in attracting foreign equity in-
vestment but may deter foreign bond investment in equal measure. Thus, the choice to reinforce shareholder
rights can be read as a choice to benet foreign shareholders to the detriment of foreign bondholders.
In particular, evidence for the relatively strong impact of the cross e¤ect of investor protection laws over
the direct e¤ect suggests that ignoring cross e¤ects entails not only missing one aspect of the overall picture,
but possibly most of it.
It is worth stressing now two major limitations that challenge the generalisability and validity of our
ndings. First, our work is limited to the investigation of the e¤ects of investor protection rights on cross-
border investments, while a more comprehensive analysis should be performed to derive general welfare
conclusions on the desirability of stronger or weaker investor protection. Moreover, we consider the de-
terminants of foreign investments, leaving unexplored the e¤ect on domestic investors. For instance, it
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may be the case that strong creditor laws attract foreign shareholders but deter domestic ones; that is, in
the presence of strong creditor rights, rms are more prone to engage in risk-reducing investments such
as diversifying acquisitions that are potentially ine¢ cient and value reducing for the domestic investors
perceived level of riskiness (Acharya et al. (2008)). On the other hand, strong shareholder rights are found
to negatively impact foreign bondholders, but this may not be the case for domestic bondholders, who may
benet from better shareholder governance. Unfortunately, domestic positions are harder to investigate due
to the limited number of available observations (one for each investing country for each available year) and
to the di¢ culty in capturing the determinants of home bias. Second, our stylized theoretical setting ignores
ination and exchange rate uncertainty, like many other models that focus on barriers to international in-
vestment (Dahlquist et al. (2003)). These factors are undoubtedly relevant and may represent an additional
source of asymmetry between foreign and domestic investors27. However, they are unlikely to be strongly
correlated with investor protection laws and therefore are not expected to undermine our results28.
Our ndings may also contribute to the literature on the failure of convergence in investor protection
legislation. Djankov et al. (2008) nd no convergence in creditor scores. La Porta et al. (2000) reject the
hypothesis of legal convergence of rules and enforcement mechanisms toward some successful standard of
e¤ective investor protection. Mansi et al. (2009) claim that competition on legal dimensions in terms of
their e¤ectiveness in attracting investment does not imply that all jurisdictions need to or should converge
to the single best or worst alternative. Consistently, our ndings may provide a rationale for the evidence
of no convergence toward the strongest investor protection setting; that is, the level of investor protection
in each country is endogenously determined by the balance of many forces  among them, the political
choice to promote inward investment and to favour particular categories of investor may play an especially
important role. In the aftermath of the recent global nancial crisis, the shared view is to implement more
regulation to constrain nancial institutions from taking excessive risk and to protect investors. However,
as underlined by Bruno and Claessens (2007), there can emerge costs from overregulation and regulations
need to be well designed. Accordingly, our ndings emphasize the need to accurately evaluate direct and
indirect consequences of strengthening regulations.
27See Lewis (1999) and Karolyi and Stulz (2003) for a review of the e¤ects of ination and exchange rate uncertainty on
portfolio choice.
28Similarly to Dahlquist et al. (2003), our results still hold, in the presence of ination and exchange rate uncertainty, provided
that returns are real, that purchasing power parity holds, and that there is an asset that has a risk-free real return.
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Table 1. Home bias
This table reports, for both stock and bond portfolios, the domestic share and the market share of each investing country.
The reported gure are averages over the period 2001-2006. Source : Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF) and
Datastream (Thomson Financial)
domestic
share
market
share
domestic
share
market
share
Austria 0.362 0.002 0.404 0.007
Belgium 0.509 0.007 0.611 0.013
Finland 0.603 0.006 0.522 0.003
France 0.681 0.046 0.571 0.047
Germany 0.502 0.035 0.737 0.072
Italy 0.629 0.023 0.788 0.049
Netherlands 0.289 0.019 0.569 0.022
Spain 0.772 0.018 0.713 0.024
Canada 0.825 0.029 0.931 0.021
Denmark 0.554 0.004 0.796 0.008
Japan 0.709 0.107 0.835 0.148
Sweden 0.550 0.010 0.739 0.008
United Kingdom 0.652 0.087 0.478 0.040
United States 0.814 0.436 0.943 0.413
Stock market Bond market
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics on bias in foreign portfolios
This table reports the average and standard deviation of portfolio bias by the fourteen investing countries in each destination
country index (head of rows) included in the opportunity set. Statistics are reported for both stock market and bond market.
Source : Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF)
average
bias
standard
deviation
of bias
average
bias
standard
deviation
of bias
Austria 0.426 0.394 0.817 0.788
Belgium 0.469 0.455 0.559 0.492
Finland 1.001 0.811 0.974 0.922
France 0.665 0.461 0.601 0.446
Germany 0.743 0.830 0.773 0.638
Italy 0.439 0.263 0.634 0.502
Netherlands 0.921 0.542 1.208 0.844
Portugal 0.426 0.461 0.769 0.774
Spain 0.481 0.284 0.680 0.569
Australia 0.160 0.156 0.215 0.105
Canada 0.118 0.132 0.147 0.101
Denmark 0.367 0.398 0.604 0.689
Japan 0.179 0.101 0.026 0.037
Mexico 0.192 0.188 0.189 0.148
Sweden 1.089 2.018 0.908 1.302
United Kingdom 0.481 0.231 0.488 0.242
United States 0.224 0.164 0.117 0.072
South Korea 0.237 0.189 0.025 0.016
Hong Kong 0.151 0.146 0.287 0.712
Singapore 0.244 0.196 0.218 0.399
median 0.426 0.580
Stock market Bond market
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Table 3. Bias in foreign equity portfolios
This table reports results of the feasible GLS regression as in (3a) in the text. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
the foreign portfolio BIAS, i.e., the ratio of portfolio share to market share, log(wlj=MSj); where the subscript lj represents
the couple investment country l -destination country j. In column (5a) the dependent variable is foreign portfolio bias corrected
for the fraction of shares closely held. In column (6a) the shareholder rightsindex (LLSV (1998)) is replaced by the antidirector
rights index corrected by Spamann (2010) Dahlquist et al. (2003). Details on the variables included as regressors are provided in
Appendix B. Constants and time dummies are included but not reported. Cross-section weights standard errors (d.f. corrected)
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5a) (6) (6a)
rel_dist *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.019 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.023 ) ( 0.020 ) ( 0.020 )
dummy_lang ** * *** *
( 0.071 ) ( 0.096 ) ( 0.094 ) ( 0.094 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.102 ) ( 0.083 ) ( 0.084 )
dummy_border *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.071 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.062 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.059 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.057 ) ( 0.057 )
dummy_emu *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.058 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.056 )
dummy_euronext ** 0.226 *** 0.273 *** 0.506 *** -0.025 0.312 *** 0.330 ***
( 0.096 ) ( 0.091 ) ( 0.092 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.085 )
dummy_eq_law 0.259 *** 0.921 *** 0.672 *** 0.976 *** 0.629 *** 0.619 ***
( 0.047 ) ( 0.051 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.061 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.066 ) ( 0.060 )
dummy_eq_law*comm_law *** *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.111 ) ( 0.120 ) ( 0.122 ) ( 0.133 ) ( 0.156 ) ( 0.139 ) ( 0.131 )
dummy_german *** * *
( 0.077 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.094 ) ( 0.081 )
dummy_french -0.196 *** 0.845 *** 0.147 0.130
( 0.075 ) ( 0.088 ) ( 0.109 ) ( 0.091 )
rel_shrights *** *** *** *** * ***
( 0.043 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.045 ) ( 0.052 ) ( 0.069 ) ( 0.066 )
rel_shrights*rel_eff_jud ***
( 0.303 ) ( 0.492 )
rel_shrights*rel_concentr ***
( 0.241 ) ( 0.146 )
rel_credrights *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.035 ) ( 0.041 ) ( 0.048 ) ( 0.043 ) ( 0.045 )
rel_credrights*rel_eff_jud ** **
( 0.353 ) ( 0.375 )
rel_control_corr * *** ***
( 0.265 ) ( 0.309 ) ( 0.487 ) ( 0.293 )
rel_control_risk_expr ***
( 0.419 ) ( 0.487 ) ( 0.943 ) ( 0.595 )
rel_account *** *** *** ***
( 0.110 ) ( 0.128 ) ( 0.114 ) ( 0.124 )
rel_concentr *** ***
( 0.060 ) ( 0.053 )
#obs 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579
Adj-R2 0.60 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.74 0.79 0.79
Bias in foreign equity portfolios
-0.371
0.443
1.965
0.671
1.167
-0.480
-0.360
0.156
0.245 0.757
-0.244
-0.117
0.734
1.314
-1.913
0.050
1.130
0.518
0.921
-0.700
0.155
0.440
-0.374
0.181
0.478
0.932
-0.578
0.419
-0.318
0.121
0.486
1.089
-1.403
-0.315
0.432
-0.358
0.181
0.419
0.914
0.221
0.019
-0.075
0.744
-0.480
0.151
0.592
0.117
0.123
1.986
0.334
-0.604
1.221
-1.327
-0.284
0.065
0.578
1.725
-1.083
0.921
-0.174
-0.294
0.043
0.555
1.218
-1.292
-0.137
0.188
0.589
-2.555
1.200
-0.715
0.999
0.382
0.947
1.300
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Table 4. Bias in foreign bond portfolios
The table reports results of the feasible GLS regression as in (3b) in the text. The dependent variable is the logarithm of
the portfolio BIAS, i.e., the ratio of portfolio share to market share, log(wlj=MSj); where the subscript lj represents the
couple investment country l -destination country j. Details on the variables included as regressors are provided in Appendix B.
In column (6a) the shareholder rightsindex (LLSV (1998)) is replaced by the antidirector rights index corrected by Spamann
(2010) Constants and time dummies are included but not reported. Cross-section weights standard errors (d.f. corrected) are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6a) (7)
rel_dist *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.029 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.029 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.028 ) ( 0.027 )
dummy_lang *** ** ** ** **
( 0.121 ) ( 0.147 ) ( 0.146 ) ( 0.146 ) ( 0.136 ) ( 0.128 ) ( 0.131 ) ( 0.125 )
dummy_border *** *** *** *
( 0.111 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.096 ) ( 0.097 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.088 ) ( 0.088 ) ( 0.088 )
dummy_emu *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
( 0.085 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.084 ) ( 0.119 ) ( 0.081 ) ( 0.082 ) ( 0.085 )
dummy_euronext *** -0.481 *** -0.494 *** -0.593 *** -0.424 *** -0.460 *** -0.283 **
( 0.127 ) ( 0.126 ) ( 0.127 ) ( 0.119 ) ( 0.121 ) ( 0.120 ) ( 0.136 )
dummy_eq_law *** -0.617 *** -0.661 *** -0.087 0.260 *** 0.439 *** 0.596 ***
( 0.069 ) ( 0.070 ) ( 0.082 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.090 ) ( 0.087 ) ( 0.147 )
dummy_eq_law*common_law *** *** *** ***
( 0.178 ) ( 0.182 ) ( 0.205 ) ( 0.222 ) ( 0.216 ) ( 0.209 ) ( 0.296 )
dummy_german *** *** *** ***
( 0.119 ) ( 0.118 ) ( 0.124 ) ( 0.232 )
dummy_french 0.121 -0.109 -0.371 *** -2.332 ***
( 0.118 ) ( 0.128 ) ( 0.132 ) ( 0.239 )
rel_shrights *** *** *
( 0.069 ) ( 0.071 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.093 )
rel_shrights*rel_eff_jud ***
( 0.470 ) ( 0.687 )
rel_takeover ***
( 0.179 )
rel_takeover*rel_eff_jud ***
( 0.986 )
rel_credrights *** *** *** * *** ***
( 0.055 ) ( 0.055 ) ( 0.063 ) ( 0.066 ) ( 0.064 ) ( 0.080 )
rel_credrights*rel_eff_jud *** *** ***
( 0.350 ) ( 0.560 ) ( 0.605 )
rel_control_corr *** *** ***
( 0.412 ) ( 0.481 ) ( 0.423 ) ( 0.442 )
rel_control_risk_expr *** ** ***
( 0.638 ) ( 0.726 ) ( 0.777 ) ( 0.934 )
rel_account ** *** ***
( 0.170 ) ( 0.174 ) ( 0.192 ) ( 0.496 )
#obs 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 1579 1417
Adj-R2 0.56 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.71 0.73 0.78
-0.408
4.348
Bias in foreign bond portfolios
1.745
3.371
3.556
-0.698
0.208
-0.367
1.611
0.109 0.219
1.557
1.255
0.873
0.885
0.994
-0.630
-0.360
-0.207
-0.499
0.304
-0.088
1.607
2.247
-0.073
-0.353
3.319
-3.175
0.375
-0.698
0.218
-0.354
1.614
2.143
-0.344
-0.331
2.811
-0.447
0.307
-0.051
1.685
-0.658
0.176
-0.290
1.615
-0.356
-0.498
1.918
-0.813
1.029
-0.060
0.103
7.540
-0.324
-2.746
-1.651
-8.042
0.583
7.489
1.413
-0.322
-0.346
0.264
0.151-0.019
0.275
-0.449
-0.155
-0.819
-0.076
1.751
0.289
-0.652
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A Theoretical framework
Following Merton (1969) with constant relative risk aversion utility function and constant investment op-
portunities the vector of optimal portfolio shares takes the well known following form:
w =
1

 1(   ri)
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, w is the vector of weights,  is the vector of stock
returns, r is the risk-free interest rate, i is a vector of ones and  is the variance-covariance matrix of stock
returns.
We incorporate in this standard setting investment cross-border barriers following Gehrig (1993) ap-
proach. In his contribution foreign investments appear on average more risky to domestic investors -leading
to an information-based justication to home bias- and the portfolio of each investor is di¤erent depending
on the perceived variance-covariance matrix29. We consider this approach focusing on foreign investment
only, considering a di¤erent investor-specic perceived variability of stock returns for each foreign stock
index in the investment opportunity set.
Let us denote by Cl the NxN positive denite diagonal matrix of investment barriers, where the j   th
diagonal element Clj is the bilateral cost of holding country js stock by country ls investor. Capturing Clj
the investment barrier cost for country l investing in j , its reciprocal
1
Clj
stands for a variable capturing
the investment "advantage" of country l investing in country j. Consequently, the optimal portfolio is no
longer universal (w) but is investor-specic (wl)
wl =
1

 1l (   ri) = C 1l 
 1
1

(   ri) (4)
where l = 
Cl (and therefore 
 1
l = C
 1
l 

 1)30
Therefore the equilibrium condition, equating stock demand and stock supply, will be
MS = 
 1

1

(   ri)

(5)
where MS represents the vector of market shares of stock market indexes (supply side) and the right
hand side is the (weighted) sum of stock indexesdemands (demand side).  is a diagonal NxN positive
denite matrix where the j th diagonal element, j =
PL
l=1MSl
1
Clj
is the average investment "advantage"
in holding asset j across investors, weighted by the market share of each investors domestic stock market.
Let us dene Dl = Cl, where Dl is again a diagonal NxN positive denite matrix. We can rewrite
the above expression (4) as
29 In a standard setting with asymmetric information (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)) an informed investor has a lower perceived
variance due to its private signal but, at the same time, her perceived expected return is generally also di¤erent from the
uninformed investors. It implies that we should sometimes observe a "foreign-bias" when the domestic investors observe bad
signals. What we, instead, label "information asymmetries" throughout the paper is closer to the concept of "model uncertainty"
or "Knightian uncertainty" (Epstein and Miao (2003) and Uppal and Wang (2003)): roughly speaking, the foreign investors
perceived uncertainty is higher than the domestic investors one, though they observe the same return. This approach may
help to understand home bias because small di¤erences in the ambiguity about the return distributions can lead to largely
under-diversied portfolio holding. The same reasoning applies when considering the allocation in several foreign stock markets
rather than the choice between home and foreign assets.
30The matrix 
 is the universal variance-covariance matrix that would prevail in absence of investment barriers.
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wl = D
 1
l 

 1  1
(   ri)

(6)
where Dlj = jClj and
1
Dlj
=
1
CljPL
l=1MSl
1
Clj
and using the equilibrium condition (5) we get the following result
wl = D
 1
l MS (7)
or, in terms of individual asset, the following optimal portfolio weights
wlj =
1
Dlj
MSj (8)
MSj is the market share of stock index j in the world stock market, 1Dlj represents the relative (with
respect to world average) "advantage" of country l investing in asset j. In other words, the investor l will
demand a share of assets greater than the market share in proportion to 1Dlj (inverse of relative investment
cost)31. Note that if Clj = j , i.e. if the investment barrier for country l is equal to the average then the
investor l will hold the value market share of asset j.
In our analysis the risky portfolio shares considered can be either stocks or bonds since, as usual, the
unique risk-free asset is determined as the residual portfolio position.
B Data appendix
B.1 Dependent variables
Foreign stock market portfolios
The CPIS dataset contains information on foreign holdings only and does not include domestic positions.
In order to derive the foreign portfolio positions in the overall portfolio we need to retrieve the share of
foreign assets. To accomplish this objective we drew from Datastream (Thomson Financial) the stock market
capitalization of all country indexes and from the International Financial Statistics (IFS ) the outstanding
foreign equity portfolio investments and the corresponding liabilities. Accordingly we can derive the foreign
equity shareof country i at time t, FSit32
FSi;t =
(FA)i;t
(MCAPi;t + FAi;t   FLi;t) (9)
where FA stands for "foreign equity assets", FL for "foreign equity liabilities" and MCAP for "stock
market capitalization". After obtaining the foreign share FS it is possible to recover the share of each
foreign asset in the overall portfolio.
Foreign bond market portfolios
31As in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2001) the share of country js equity held by country l is a decreasing (increasing) function of
the
bilateral trading cost (e¢ ciency) between l and j relative to the average trading cost (e¢ ciency) between country j and all
other
countries.
32Fidora et al. (2007) and Sorensen et al. (2007) follow the same procedure dealing with the CPIS dataset.
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The same procedure applies to determine the foreign bond share. The outstanding foreign xed securities
portfolio investments and the corresponding liabilities are still drawn from the IFS while the source for bond
market capitalization is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Security Statistics containing data on
international debt securities by residence of issuer and domestic debt securities by residence of issuer of all
maturities and sectors. In our analysis short term and long term xed securities are pooled together. In
fact, in the CPIS dataset debt instruments are partly broken down by long-term debt and short-term debt,
with the latter being dened as debt securities with an original maturity of up to one year. However, not
all countries provide a breakdown of debt securities by maturity whereas they report the total value of debt
securities. Moreover, we cannot identify amounts outstanding of debt securities by original maturity, as the
BIS only provides a separate breakdown for debt securities with remaining maturity of up to one year.
Market share
Market shares refer to the values at the end of December of each year.
Source: Datastream, Thomson Financial
World oat portfolio
The world oat portfolio is a corrected value weighted portfolio obtained by multiplying the market
share by a fraction taking into account the fraction of closely held shares (Dahlquist et al. (2003)). We
convert our world market portfolio weights into world oat portfolio weights (Dahlquist et al. (2003), Table
2). We keep the conversion coe¢ cient invariant over the time period considered being the fraction of country
closely-held shares quite stable over a short time horizon while the most important variability dimension,
the cross-sectional one, is properly taken into account.
B.2 Regressors
Proximity variables
Distance
The distance is measured as the Great Circle distance in miles between capital cities of source (l) and
destination (j) country. The average distance from a destination country (j) is obtained as weighted (by
market share) average of the distance of investing countries. The variable included in the regression is the
logarithm of the ratio of the distance l   j to the average distance.
Border dummy
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a common
border (0 otherwise).
Language dummy
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share a common
language (0 otherwise)
Euronext dummy (Common Stock Exchange dummy)
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country share the Euronext
stock exchange platform (0 otherwise). In our case, it coincides with a common stock exchange dummy since
the investing countries considered did not merge in a common stock exchange with other countries.
EMU dummy (Common Currency dummy)
Dummy variable taking value of 1 if the investing country and the destination country are members of
the European Monetary Union (0 otherwise). In our case, it coincides with a common currency dummy
since do not belong to any other currency union.
Equal law
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the investing country and the destination country belong to the same
legal root, common law or civil law.
Legal origin
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Identies the legal origin of the company law or commercial code of each country: English, French,
German, Scandinavian. One of the four legal dummies must be dropped out of the analysis to avoid
multicollinearity and represents the benchmark origin (Scandinavian in our case). Due to perfect correlation
between the interaction common_laweq_law and the English origin this is also dropped from the analysis.
Creditor rights
An index aggregating creditor rights, following LLSV (1998). A score of one is assigned when each of
the following rights of secured lenders are dened in laws and regulations: 1) restrictions, such as creditor
consent or minimum dividends, for a debtor to le for reorganization; 2) secured creditors are able to seize
their collateral after the reorganization petition is approved, i.e. there is no automatic stay or asset freeze;
3) secured creditors are paid rst out of the proceeds of liquidating a bankrupt rm,as opposed to other
creditors such as government or workers; 4) management does not retain administration of its property
pending the resolution of the reorganization. The original index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4
(strong creditor rights). Since we consider the variable in log form, to avoid problems when the argument
is zero, we add one unit to each score.
Shareholder rights
An index aggregating shareholder rights, following LLSV (1998). It is obtained combining the antidi-
rector rights index and the one share-one vote rule. A score of one is assigned when each of the following
rights:
a) one share-one vote rule. Equals one if the company law or commercial code of the country requires
that ordinary shares carry one vote per share and zero otherwise. See LLSV (1998) for further details.
b) antidirector rights: measure how strongly the legal system favors minority shareholders against man-
agers or dominant shareholders in the corporate decision making process. This is an index formed by adding
one when (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote directly to the rm, (2) shareholders
are not require to deposit their shares prior to a shareholdersmeeting, (3) cumulative voting for directors or
proportional representation in the board is allowed, (4) an oppressed minority mechanism is in place, (5) the
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders
meeting is less than 10 percent, or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a
shareholdersvote. The original index ranges from zero to six, from zero to seven adding the one share-one
vote rule. Our shareholder rights index which combines antidirector rights and one share-one vote rule
ranges from 1 to 8 as we adopt a log specication.
Corrected Antidirector Rights Index
The index is constructed by Spamann (2010). It is constructed as in LLSV (1998) but a reexamination
of the legal data leads to corrections for thirty-three out of forty-six countries analyzed. The correlation
between corrected and original values is 0.53.
Takeover Index
The takeover laws index is a simple average of 12 components characterizing takeover laws around the
world (See Nenova (2006) for details on the construction of the index).
Corruption index
ICRs assessment of the corruption in government. Scale from zero to 10, with lower scores for higher
levels of corruption (LLSV (1998)).
Expropriation risk
ICRs assessment of the risk of "outright conscation" or "forced nationalization". Scale from zero to
10 with lower scores for higher risk (LLSV (1998)).
Accounting rules
Index based on information disclosure and accounting practices (LLSV (1998)).
E¢ ciency of judicial system
Assessment of the "e¢ ciency and integrity of the legal environment as it a¤ects business, particularly
foreign rms" produced by Business International Corporation. Scale from zero to 10 with lower scores for
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lower e¢ ciency level.
Ownership concentration
Average percentage of common shares not owned by the top three shareholders in the ten largest non-
nancial, privately-owned domestic rms in a given country (LLSV (1998))
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